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Albert M. Church*
Economic Rent, Economic Efficiency,
and the Distribution of Natural
Resource Tax Burdens: Copper and
Coal
Nearly all phases of extracting and processing natural resources are
subject to taxation. These levies include taxes on output (severance,
privilege, and resource excise taxes, as well as royalty and lease payments
to government as resource owner), on inputs to the production process
(taxes on labor, materials and investment goods), on profits (corporate
income taxes and net proceeds and lease payments), and on the resource
in situ (property taxes on reserves and bonus lease payments). Although
the effect of taxes on extraction costs, the rate of extraction, exploration
and development (as well as investments in processing facilities), ore
grade, total recovery, and the time path of prices of the extracted resource
and the resource in situ are relatively well developed in the literature,'
criteria for developing an optimum tax policy and evaluating actual tax
policies are not included in this literature. The first section of this paper
summarizes the economist's methods for evaluating tax policy. It should
serve as a useful introduction to the other papers in this symposium issue.
The next section reviews the simulation of the effects of alternative tax
policies in models of the domestic (U.S.) copper and coal industries. In
the final section, the results of the simulations are evaluated in light of
the methods discussed in the first section.
EVALUATING TAX POLICY
Economists have traditionally analyzed taxes from two distinct view-
points. The first approach derives from welfare economics. It is used to
measure how taxation affects the allocation of resources and is called
allocative efficiency or Pareto optimality. When taxes alter consumption,
production, or investment decisions, a tax distortion is said to occur.
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for financial support and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Materials Science
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These distortions are, in principle, measurable.2 The second approach
focuses on determining who ultimately bears the burden of a tax. This
analysis reveals that a tax does not necessarily remain on the tax base on
which it is first levied. This change in incidence is called tax shifting.
The 1973 oil embargo, OPEC's invigoration, the subsequent escalation
of all natural resource prices, and the 1979 Iranian revolution leading to
oil production cutbacks and price increases have resulted in enormous
increases in the value of previously discovered reserves. These changes
have created actual and perceived economic rents which provide tanta-
lizing sources of tax revenue. Economic rent is defined as the amount by
which the price of a good or service could be reduced (taxed) without
motivating its owner to alter the use and employment of that resource.
Clearly, economic rents potentially may accrue to any commodity but,
perhaps, appear to be particularly endemic to natural resource markets.
Recent changes in federal and subnational tax and regulatory policies in
the U.S. and Canada reveal the competition among political jurisdictions,
resource owners, producers and consumers over natural resource based
wealth and economic rents.
One of the better known and sometimes least understood theorems in
economics states that the resource allocation derived from maximizing
social welfare (applicable to all economic goods) is identical to the re-
source allocation resulting from the operation of competitive markets
(assuming that economic markets are perfect, which basically means that
no economic agent acts as if they are able to affect prices).3 This theorem
that market equilibrium corresponds to the socially efficient allocation
means that resources are applied to their highest valued use. The con-
ditions necessary for Pareto Optimality (defined as the allocative pattern
in which the only way one individual can be made better off is by making
one or more individuals worse off) can be shown to be achievable under
all possible distributions of income. Introducing a tax destroys the cor-
respondence by driving a wedge between what one party pays and what
the other receives in a transaction. This wedge will create a "distortion"
in the allocation of resources away from the socially optimal or efficient
allocation unless the tax falls on economic rent.
The social costs of tax induced distortions can be quantitatively esti-
mated. Perhaps the best known advocate for the efficacy of this approach
in public policy analysis is Arnold Harberger.4 The technique is described
2. A HARBERGER, TAXATION, RESOURCE ALLOCATION, AND WELFARE IN THE
ROLE OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT TAXES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1964).
3. A. ATKINSON & J. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS (1980); T. PAGE,
CONSERVATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: AN APPROACH TO MATERIAL POLICY
(1977).
4. HARBERGER, supra note 2.
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most easily in a diagram. Figure 1 depicts price (P) on the vertical axis
and the flow of a good or service over time (Q) on the horizontal axis.
The ubiquitous demand curve, labelled as DD, reveals and depicts the
"law of demand" (an inverse relationship between price and quantity).
The demand curve is also known as the "willingness to pay" function
because consumer behavior involves voluntary exchanges and the demand
curve measures this "willingness" in dollar quantities. The equally fa-
mous "law of supply," as shown by the curve labelled SS, reveals the
behavior of businessmen. The curve depicts a positive relationship be-
tween price and quantity which results from technological constraints and
profit maximizing behavior. Market equilibrium occurs (QoPo) when the
amount supplied equals the amount demanded, and the only such point
achieved with price acting as an allocating mechanism is point QoPo. This
point corresponds to the maximum number of voluntary exchanges and
the maximum net social value for the good Q (measured by the area
under demand, DD, and above supply, SS).
A tax levied on consumers or producers affects costs or gross prices
(with the tax). In Figure 1, a tax of T per unit is levied on the commodity
Q. This tax drives a wedge between what consumers pay and what pro-
ducers receive. Figure 1 reflects this difference (T) as a shift in the supply
curve upwards (to S'S') by the amount of the tax. The net (after tax)
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FIGURE 1.
Supply and Demand with Tax Shifting
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amount received by businessmen determines their production decisions
and consumers face the gross price which includes the tax. The new
equilibrium occurs at (QPI) where consumers pay P, and producers re-
ceive P2, net after taxes (PI - P2 = T). When less is produced (Q,),
scarce resources are released and presumably are employed elsewhere in
the economy. The supply curve depicts the value of the next best alter-
native use for inputs used or released (opportunity cost) as the production
of Q increases or decreases. Consumers value the commodity not pro-
duced and consumed because of increased taxes and lowered consumption
(Q0 - Qj) by the area under the demand curve. The difference between
the value consumers placed on these foregone commodities (willingness
to pay) and the opportunity cost of production (amount produced in the
next best employment for resources released) is depicted as the vertically
lined triangle in Figure 1. This triangle can be estimated quantatively if
the demand and supply functions and the tax rate are known. It measures
welfare loss or the net social loss due to the tax induced distortion in
resource allocation (a reduction to Q, from Q.). This net welfare loss is
also known as "excess burden" because it exceeds the amount of tax
revenues (T X Qj) and the value (opportunity cost) of resources released
from producing less Q (the area under supply from Q, to Qo).
This diagram depicts a partial equilibrium model. As such, it is ov-
ersimplified because it fails to accurately account for what happens in
the rest of the economy. The tax revenue collected (T x Q1) may be
spent in a way which benefits consumers more or less than alternative
uses of the inputs. In balanced budget tax incidence, this effect is neu-
tralized by assuming government spends the tax revenue in precisely the
same manner which consumers would have.
The tax induced shift in resource allocation shown in Figure 1 results
in tax shifting. When equilibrium is reestablished, prices have changed
because of altered resource allocation. The relative change in prices from
a pre- to a post-tax situation measures the actual burden of the tax which
is levied on producers (supply) or consumers (demand). In the example
shown in Figure 1, the gross price to the consumer increases (PI - P0 =
a) and the net price to the producer decreases (P1 - P2 = b). These relative
price changes show the percentage of the burden falling on consumers
[a/(a + b)] and on firms [b/(a + b)]. The relative burdens depend on the
properties of the demand and supply curves and their relationship deter-
mines who ultimately pays for the tax.
In a general equilibrium model of tax shifting and incidence, the burden
to each group and sector of the economy is measured by tax induced
price changes. The tax burden can only fall on persons. Thus, tax burden
analysis traces the effects of taxes on transactions (e.g. sales taxes),
incomes and commodities to effected persons. These effects are measured
by changes in income uses (tax induced changes in prices of final con-
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sumption, called forward shifting) or income sources (tax induced changes
in payments, called backward shifting, for the factors of production, labor,
capital, land, and natural resources). The example in Figure 1 shows a
partial equilibrium model in which tracing the tax burden back to the
factors of production used by the firm is not possible. The distribution
of the tax burden among factors of production depends on technology
and economic markets. In most cases, tax policy induces resource real-
locations which inevitably result in tax shifting. Taxes on economic rents,
however, are an exception to this general rule. A tax on economic rent
by definition cannot be shifted onto others and consequently produces no
distortion or excess burden. In its broadest definition, economic ent is
a payment for a commodity or factor of production in excess of the amount
required to secure use of that scarce resource from its owner. Alternatively,
economic rent can be defined as the difference between market price and
opportunity cost. Opportunity cost indicates how valuable a resource is
in its next best employment. Thus, payment above that level is unnec-
essary for putting the resource to its most productive use. The public
sector may socialize economic rents through taxes or regulation. In private
markets, individuals capture economic rents through negotiation, law
suits, and other activities which affect property rights. Economists have
shown, however, that in "a rent seeking society," an incentive to expand
resources to capture or to secure rents exists. These expenditures represent
the dissipation of rents because resources are used in capturing them.
Economic rents provide an attractive but notoriously elusive tax target.
Isolating the economic rent without affecting resource allocation in the
process poses a difficult policy task.'
Economic rents occur in natural resource industries for a number of
reasons. Natural resources are unique either because they are nonrenew-
able or because the laws of nature govern their rate of regeneration
(renewable resources). Every unit of a nonrenewable resource extracted
today translates into a decrease in the amount available in the future.
When the rate of extraction for renewable resources exceeds the resource's
maximum growth rate, the stock is depleted and extinction is possible.
Economists have analyzed the behavior of the resource owner and the
extractive firm. These analyses show that when property rights to the
resource are clearly assigned, markets are stable, the price of the resource
in situ increases at the rate of interest, and competitive markets allocate
the resource in a socially efficient manner over time (when the future is
known with certainty and future contingency markets exist).6 For these
conditions to hold, the value of the ownership right to the resource is
5. A. CHURCH, TAXATION OF NONRENEWABLE RESOURCES (1981).
6. Peterson & Fisher, The Exploitation of Extractive Resources: A Survey, 87 ECON. J. 681
(1977); Schulze, The Optimal Use of Non-Renewable Resources: The Theory of Extraction, I J.
ENVT'L. ECON. & MGMT. (1974).
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assumed to be transferable and to reflect its opportunity cost (the theory
is part of the modem interpretation of capital and investment). Oppor-
tunity cost to a resource owner is the alternative of extracting the resource
today or at some point in the future. Equilibrium obtains when the owner
is indifferent as to when to extract the resource. Indifference with respect
to time implies that the owner's natural wealth will increase at the op-
portunity rate of return to all investments, natural and man made, re-
gardless of whether the owner allows the resource to remain an unexploited
reserve or decides to extract it, sell it, and invest the profits at the going
rate of interest. The sacrifice of future profits entailed by present extraction
has been coined "user cost." User cost increases at the rate of interest
and measures the scarcity value of the resource.7 Although extraction
over time requires determining differential scarcity values among time
periods, a resource's initial value can be taxed away as economic rent
without any distortion in resource use. This scarcity value is one source
of economic rent.
Searching for and exploiting natural resources is risky. Modern capital
theory shows that the rate of return on investment increases with risk. If
this were not the case, riskier investments would not be made and con-
sequently, higher profit rates are required to induce riskier investments.
These returns are not economic rent. Unanticipated windfalls, however,
represent economic rent because resource allocation decisions are made
in their absence. There are three major sources of windfalls associated
with natural resources--discovery windfalls, market windfalls and gov-
ernment policy windfalls. When exploration and development activities
are undertaken, entrepreneurs have anticipated a probability distribution
for various outcomes. When their expectations are fulfilled, no economic
rents are created. Occasionally, a discovery far exceeds expectations and
these "bonanzas," such as the original Alaska North Slope oil find,
produce economic rents. Market windfalls occur when an unanticipated
event, such as the 1979 Iranian revolution which curtailed Middle Eastern
oil production, affects normal or expected market equilibrium and in-
creases prices. A third source of windfalls occurs when government changes
tax, expenditure or regulatory policy in a way which benefits an economic
interest group. These economic windfalls can be taxed in their entirety
or in part without affecting resource allocation, as long as the tax falls
only on the economic rent. The "windfall" oil tax of 1979 supplies an
example; its rates were designed to burden the various categories of oil
being regulated in a manner which minimize resource distortions and
maximize government's shares.
The quality of natural resources in situ is not uniform. Differential ore
7. Scott, Notes on User Cost, 63 ECON. J. 453 (1953).
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grades, location and other factors affect extraction costs. Differential
extraction costs give rise to economic rents because the differences in
profit associated with the highest cost and lowest cost resource can be
taxed away (socialized) without affecting resource use. Thus, differential
resource quality gives rise to economic rent. The monopolist extracts a
resource more slowly than competitive firms (which extract at the most
efficient rate). This results in higher resource prices and profits. This
above normal profit from exercising market power is economic ("mo-
nopoly") rent.
Another source of economic rent is engendered by unpriced and in-
voluntarily exchanged commodities and services. When an extractive firm
is able to obtain resources at less than their market prices (for example,
through noncompetitive leasing of government mineral or timber rights),
or "free" use of a scarce resource (for example the dumping of residuals
into the air, water and land), economic rents are produced. As one might
expect, economic rents are an enticing tax objective. Although taxing
them results in no economic losses, it does affect the distribution of income
(reduced net income) and wealth (capitalized after tax income flows) to
the recipients of economic rents.
The objectives of tax policymakers depend on the unit of government
and the collective decisions of the body politic. The economist's view
holds that tax policy should be neutral in order to maximize national
welfare (i.e. minimize tax induced resource waste and inefficiency). A
welfare maximization goal requires that tax policy be formulated in such
a way as either to create no distortions (a neutral tax policy), or to
minimize the distortions induced by taxes. This optimal tax policy ob-
jective assumes that the national government pursues the efficiency goal
for the entire country. In most countries, however, subnational units of
government possess tax and regulatory powers which may be imposed
in ways which work at cross purposes with both national efficiency goals
and the goals of other jurisdictions because of regional self interests.
However appropriate the goal of a neutral tax policy, it is probably not
a motivating force in actual decision making. The potential and perceived
impact of taxes and expenditures on various groups in society creates
special interest constituencies who seek to benefit and protect themselves.
These constituencies compete. A hodgepodge of taxes and expenditures
results, making the term "policy" inappropriate because of the disparate
and conflicting interests served.8 These parochial interests compete at the
federal, state, and local levels.
Subnational units of government intently serve regional and local in-
8. Church, State Taxation of Coal-Revealed Performances of Economic Development Versus the
Tax Exploitation of a Natural Resource, WESTERN TAX J. (1980).
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terest groups because these groups are composed of voting residents.
However, overall objectives of state and local government policymakers
have not been clearly characterized in the professional literature. Never-
theless, the taxation of natural resources is uniquely amenable to differ-
ential policies among taxing jurisdictions because the resource is immobile.
The situation of one jurisdiction containing a large body of reserves,
which for analytic convenience is assumed to be exported in its entirety,
and the effect of subnational taxes can be analyzed by expanding Figure
1. The demand curve for the resource (DD) and the supply curves (SS)
for all producers except those in the jurisdiction introducing a tax policy
resemble those developed for Figure 1 and are shown in Panel A of Figure
2. The supply curves indicate that producers with resources in this juris-
diction possess high quality/low cost reserves which are less expensive
to extract than reserves in the rest of the world. Demand for this juris-
diction (Dnet) is derived from Panel A and equals the difference between
world supply and demand at all prices below the intersection of world
supply and demand, without this jurisdiction's contribution. From the
standpoint of the taxing jurisdiction, all of the revenue in Panel B in the
area above Po and below the net demand curve (Dnet) represents potential
economic rent which initially is going to consumers in other jurisdictions.
Should the jurisdiction impose a per unit tax on the resource extracted,
an increase in production costs occurs which may be depicted as an upward
shift in the supply curve by the amount of the tax (S + T) in Panel B.
This change is identical to the tax effect shown in Figure 1. In the case
of a zero tax, producers in the jurisdiction produce Q. at price P., and
capture the portion of the market (exports) denoted as D in Panel A.
Producers in other jurisdictions have portion E of the total market. The
imposition of a tax (T) by this one jurisdiction, however, results in an
increase in market prices to P, and a decrease in the jurisdiction's output
to Q1, which means that their exports account for portion F of the world
market (Panel A). Panel C depicts the tax policy alternatives available to
the taxing jurisdiction. The horizontal axis shows the amount of the
resource extracted and lines up with Panel A. The vertical axis depicts
tax revenue (T x Q). The curve GG shows the feasible tax revenues
available to the jurisdiction at different tax rates and the output which
corresponds to those tax rates. Tax revenue must equal zero at a zero tax
rate (at Q. in Panel C) and at a tax rate so high that producers subject to
the tax cease to operate. Consequently, the alternative tax revenues/output
combinations have limits. Panel C is useful in analyzing the options
available to tax policy makers. Producing at higher levels of output creates
benefits to the jurisdiction and its residents, as well as to those who are
directly employed, many of whom may be immigrants. Payrolls and local
expenditures have indirect effects which create secondary economic ac-
[Vol. 22
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FIGURE 2.
Effects of a Tax on Natural Resource Exports
tivity, jobs, and incomes which depend on the extent and characteristics
of the local market. This economic activity also generates government
revenues from sales, income, and other taxes. These effects can be char-
acterized as the benefits of development, which are offset by the associated
costs of environmental damage, "boomtowns," and required public ex-
penditures. Tax revenues derived directly from resource extraction may
be employed to mitigate these costs, provide public services, and allow
reductions in other taxes. Policymakers and the public may be thought
of as possessing relative preferences for these conflicting resource de-
velopment and tax exploitation objectives. The implied rate of trade-off
between the two objectives is depicted as HH in Panel C. If the goal
July 1982)
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were to maximize tax revenues, the preferred tax rate would correspond
to the peak of GG. Some observers have hypothesized that the goal in
some resource rich states is to maximize tax exporting.9 Tax exporting
occurs both when nonresident owners of productive resources and non-
resident firms and consumers bear the burden of a tax. The share of the
burden shifted to nonresident consumers is depicted by Panel B by the
difference between the pre-tax and the post-tax price (distance a). The
portion of the tax falling on resources and inputs to the extractive firm
(capital and labor) is shown as distance b. This portion of the tax is shifted
to labor, owners of extractive firms and owners of resources, and it is
necessary to know the technology of production and the supply of these
factors in order to analyse relative tax shifting and tax exporting to non-
residents resource and capital owners. It has been shown that the market
share of the taxing state is a critical determinant of the ability to shift
taxes forward to consumers.' 0
Tax shifting also causes prices for all the extracted resources to rise
(from all jurisdictions). This price increase benefits producers in other
areas and may stimulate increases as other policymakers see the potential
revenue. The portion of the tax burden exported by the jurisdiction to
consumers is labeled J. Consumers pay more for a smaller amount of the
resource which comes from all jurisdictions (assuming inelastic demand).
Thus, even a tax which results in a small fractional price change may
burden consumers by the entire tax revenue raised in the taxing jurisdic-
tion. This outcome implies that other jurisdictions benefit from the tax
because their output expands, prices rise, and the value of their resources
increase commensurately. It follows that other resource rich areas may
not only be encouraged to tax, but would be expected to encourage tax
increases by their neighbors and "competitors." This behavior can be
observed in recent increases in coal severance taxes in Wyoming, North
Dakota, and New Mexico triggered by Montana's 30 percent tax invoked
in 1975, and in the creation of other organizations made up of resource
rich states."' The concern expressed by energy consuming states over
bearing the burden of taxes on fuels exported from producing states is
simplistic. Figure 2 reveals that exporting the tax burden to consumers
and nonresident owners involves more factors than observing trade flows.
To the extent that forward shifting does occur, however, its impact on
consumers is amplified to the entire amount produced and consumed.
This poses a legitimate concern to consuming regions which was ex-
9 Shelton & Morgan, Resource Taxation, Tax Exportation and Regional Energy Policies, 12
NAT. RES. J. 261 (1977).
10. This result is implied by conditions derived in McClure, Market Dominance and the Exporting
of State Taxes, NAT'L TAX J. (forthcoming).
11. CHURCH, supra note 5.
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pressed in the Commonwealth Edison v. Montana Supreme Court case
concerning the 30 percent coal severance tax. I2 The court held the tax to
be constitutional and that tax limitations would have to come from the
legislative branch.
The tax depicted in Figure 2 produces burdens which exceed the tax
engendered price increases to a consumer and price decreases to owners
of productive inputs. These excessive burdens correspond to the tax en-
gendered welfare losses described in Figure 1. The first such net loss
occurs because producers in other jurisdictions expand output and thereby
use up scarce resources. The darkened triangle in Panel A (labeled k)
depicts the net loss resulting from the consumption of labor and man
made capital for suboptimal purposes and from the extraction of the higher
cost natural resource before it otherwise would have been extracted in
the nontax situation. Triangle L depicts the second welfare loss, the net
loss to consumers who sacrifice the consumer surplus which would have
been created in the nontax situation. The final component is the net profits
or producer surplus lost by owners of extractive firms in the taxing ju-
risdiction because of curtailed output. This loss is labeled as M in Panel
B. The magnitude of these three components depends on the properties
of the demand and supply functions. The goal of economic efficiency is
achieved when excess tax burdens are eliminated or, as a second best,
are minimized. This efficiency criteria of welfare economics would only
be operative, if at all, at the national government level. Tax policymakers
in subnational jurisdictions seek a parochial objective. They evaluate the
benefits derived from using taxes to socialize resource income relative to
benefits resulting from stimulating economic development by maintaining
low taxes. Even if policymakers in some jurisdictions sought only eco-
nomic development, and this would imply zero total taxes, the incentive
to support high taxes in other jurisdictions would remain. Should the
federal government step in and mandate that the efficiency goal prevail,
the steps necessary to implement that goal in the presence of existing
taxes could not be easily ascertained. First, taxes falling on true economic
rents are not resource distorting and thus would have to be identified and
left unaffected. Second, the policy would have to focus on how to reduce
or eliminate excess burdens. Tax effects, however, are interdependent.
For example, the excess burden of a tax increase in one region is offset
partially when output is shifted to other regions where taxes were pre-
viously in place. This shift counters prevailing tax distortions and the
12. W. HELLERSTEIN, LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON STATE TAXATION OF NATURAL RE-
SOURCES IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM (1981) (paper presented at TRED Confer-
ence, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, MA.).
July 1982]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
attendent excess burdens. Harberger develops a measure of net welfare
loss to account for these interdependencies. 3 In its simplest form it is:
2-1/ .TiAQ,
where & Q, is the tax induced change in output in region i and Ti is the
previous tax in effect on commodity i. This is summed over all affected
regions. The 1/2 comes from approximating the welfare loss triangle and
the minus (-) comes from measuring welfare loss by a positive number.
Nevertheless this measure may prove difficult to implement in practice.
The incentive for subnational jurisdictions to impose taxes or to benefit
from the effects of others can be analyzed in another way by testing for
the existence of market power. When a jurisdiction or group of jurisdic-
tions acting together affects prices, they possess market power and may
forward shift their tax burdens. Possessing a large share of the market or
possessing significantly higher quality/lower cost resource stock is a pre-
requisite to market power. This can be seen in Figure 2 as either the net
demand curve (Dnet) in Panel B shifted up and to the right or the supply
curve (S other) shifted down and to the left. The term "market dominance"
has been used by McLure and Gillis who analyzed the potential for bauxite
producers to export tax burdens. 4 The potential market power of the state
with the dominant copper production (Arizona) and the potential of the
low sulfur/low cost coal producing states of Montana and Wyoming are
discussed in the next section. These states export nearly all of the extracted
resources and so conform closely to the assumption of 100 percent re-
source exporting made in Figure 2.
Certain jurisdictions consume significant quantities of their own re-
sources. The consumption of natural gas in Texas and Louisiana provides
examples of such consumption. The analysis shown in Figure 2 does not
apply appropriately to these cases. When significant consumption takes
place within the jurisdiction, the amount exported is a residual. Demand
and supply of the resource within the jurisdiction is depicted in Panel A
of Figure 3. The demand curve (D) is for in-jurisdiction use and supply
represents total production. Panel B illustrates the demand outside of the
jurisdiction (or net demand derived in a manner similar to the method
used to establish the demand curve in Panel B, Figure 2). The supply
curve (Snet) shows the difference between the supply and demand curves
in Panel A. Figure 3 shows that output is sold both in state and out of
state at the same price, which implies that transportation costs are assumed
13. HARBERGER, supra note 2.
14. Gillis & McClure, Taxation of Natural Resources-incidence of World Taxes on Natural
Resources with Special Reference to Bauxite, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 389 (1975).
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FIGURE 3.
Effects of a Tax Within and Out of Jurisdiction Consumption
to be zero. Should the jurisdiction decide to invoke a tax on the resources,
the tax would have to be at a uniform rate on interstate and intrastate
sales to avoid violating the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The tax on the extracted resource shifts the supply curve (S + T) upwards
in Panel A. Consequently, the quantity of the exported resource falls from
Qo to Q, (Panel B). The burden of the tax falls on both in and out of
jurisdiction consumers and on producers (owners of resources and capital)
according to the proportions a/T and b/T (T = a + b) as shown in Panel
A. A significant portion of consumers reside in the jurisdiction, and the
total burden they bear is denoted by the vertically lined area in Panel A.
Out of jurisdiction consumers pay the diagonally lined segment of total
tax revenue (area C in Panel B) with the remainder falling on owners of
extractive firms and resources (assuming that labor is perfectly mobile).
The net loss to society engendered by the tax consists of the loss in
consumer surplus to residents of the jurisdiction (A in Panel A, Figure
3), the loss of net producer surplus to firms (B in Panel A, Figure 3) and
the loss of consumer surplus to nonresidents (D in Panel B, Figure 3).
As in previous cases, all of these magnitudes depend on the properties
of the demand and supply functions. When a portion of the resource is
consumed or used in manufacturing or other production within the state,
the likelihood of the burden being significantly internalized increases. As
the number of suppliers from other jurisdictions grows, the demand for
the exported portion of the product becomes more price elastic (price
responsive). This effect reduces the portion of the tax forward shifted to
consumers and places the burden on producers. Under these conditions,
July 19821
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the incentive to impose taxes decreases. Hence, the state of Texas, where
approximately two-thirds of Texan natural gas is consumed, taxes natural
gas at a relatively low rate.
The foregoing analysis assumes that time is frozen. While this analytic
convenience is acceptable for infinitely reproducible commodities, it is
less acceptable for resources which are fixed and ultimately exhaustible.
Taxes have been shown to distort the rate of extraction from known
reserves, the quality break point where material is either extracted or left
in the ground (ore cutoff grade), and the level of investment in exploration
and development.' 5 Although the static assumption made in Figures 1,
2, and 3 fails to capture the entire spectrum of resource dislocations and
distortions created by taxation, the supply curves as depicted reflect much
of those effects. The error becomes significant in two cases. First, our
model's failure to completely reflect dislocative and distortive effects gains
importance as accumulated past extraction depletes the resource to the
point that exhaustion is close enough to significantly affect resource prices.
Except for conventionally extracted fuels, the specter of imminent exhaustion
is not generally present because of the large stocks of lower quality resources
and the possibility of supply expansion through technological change and
substitution of other materials justifiable at somewhat higher costs. The
second situation in which the error becomes significant occurs when the ore-
cutoff level is increased as a result of a tax and the bypassed material becomes
irretrievable. This loss occurs, for example, in coal mining when overburden
is replaced or underground ceilings collapse. The models of the domestic
copper and coal industries are designed to reflect the significance of these
potential tax induced distortions.
THE COPPER AND COAL MODELS
The models of the domestic copper and coal industries are first de-
scribed briefly. Next estimates of tax burdens and tax induced net losses
due to resource misallocation are reviewed. The intent with each industry
model is to simulate how these resource markets function and respond
to differential state taxes. Resource depletion is handled differently in
each model. The copper model should be interpreted as depicting the
near-term, three to five years and mid-terms, five to fifteen years. For
the near-term, currently developed mine sites, both those in operation
and those shutdown, are analyzed in detail. For the mid-term, existing sites
with large reserves and those sites which have been evaluated for devel-
opment by mining firms are included. This approach assumes that the ore-
grade at each site will remain constant. Depletion is specifically accounted
for in the coal model; production and consumption during each five year
15. Burness, supra note I; CONRAD & HOOL, supra note 1; and CHURCH, supra note 5.
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increment from 1977 to 2000 is estimated for low and high sulfur coal.
Thus accumulative production depletes reserves. Depletion shows up as
rising recovery costs over time in the coal model, whereas the copper model
is static. The 1977 level of taxes provides the benchmark in analysing the
effects of increased taxes on production, consumption, efficiency, and most
importantly on prices which indicate forward shifting to consumers, changes
in rents going to extractive firms, and to state treasuries. Two tax regimes
are simulated for copper producing states-a simultaneous tax increase and
a unilateral tax increase by the largest producer, Arizona. One tax regime
other than 1977 taxes and a zero tax environment is simulated for coal-a
joint policy of the largest, low cost/low sulfur producers, Montana and
Wyoming, seeking to maximize their tax revenues jointly.
The Copper Model
The copper model concentrates on the supply process which involves
the extraction, milling, concentrating, smelting and refining of copper
bearing ores. 6 Demand specification is approximated from previously
estimated models of the copper industry. The model is quantified by actual
site specific engineering and accounting data for several major sites in
the southwestern U.S. (collected from on-site visits in 1978-1979), sta-
tistical approximations for sites for which these proprietary data were not
available (costs modeled as functions of ore grade, stripping ratios, per-
cent recovery factor, capacity utilization and other factors), and projected
costs for mines which are under development or have been temporarily
shut down. A short and long run marginal cost curve (incremental cost
per unit of production) is estimated for each site. In the near term or
short run, past investment (capital stock) is fixed, as are sunk costs, which
do not affect the management decision of whether to operate or not. If
revenues cover operating and maintenance costs (variable and semi-var-
iable costs), then the mine mill smelter complex will be active unless net
operating revenues are so low that shutting down would be more eco-
nomical because certain fixed costs can be reduced upon shutdown. In
the mid-term or long run, reproducible capital is mobile as the resource
reserves are depleted and plant and equipment wears out and becomes
fully depreciated. Thus, all operations, maintenance, and capital costs
(amortized over production) are relevant to the long run operation deci-
sion, and investment can occur via new mine openings. In order for the
firm to operate at each specific site, revenues must cover all variables
and fixed costs as well as opportunity costs which include a competitive
return on equity capital.
16. Foley & Clark, The Effects of State Taxation on the United States Copper Supply, LAND
ECON. (forthcoming).
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We hypothesize that the marginal (incremental) and average (per unit)
costs are constant for each recovery technology at each site, up to a
capacity output dictated by equipment and mine design. Industry experts
confirmed the plausibility of this linear technology/constant cost approx-
imation. Production beyond designed capacity is assumed to be impract-
ical and is characterized by infinite incremental costs.
The supply curve for U.S. domestic production is the summation of
the marginal cost functions arrayed in order of unit (marginal) costs for
each recovery technology at each mine/mill/smelter complex (open pit
sulfide, underground sulfide, heap leaching, vat leaching, and waste dump
leaching) and is limited by design capacity. Thus aggregate marginal cost
is discontinuous and lumpy and rises due to the increased costs for each
recovery process at each site. The supply curve thus simultaneously de-
picts depletion (as more costly mines come into operation), differential
economic rent, and implied industry profitability. Aggregation was carried
out for each state as well as for the nation. Taxes as of 1977 were
incorporated in the cost estimates as falling on variable and fixed inputs.
Thus, severance taxes shift short run marginal costs upwards because
they add to the cost of extraction. Arizona's property tax, levied on the
estimated present value of future profitability of each site and imposed
during operation and for three years after shutdown, is fixed and inde-
pendent of the extraction rate in the short run. Hypothesized changes in
taxes shift the short and long run marginal cost curves for sites according
to the type of tax and how it affects the operation, maintenance, and
capital costs for each site.
Aggregating the cost curves produces state and national supply curves.
The demand curve is abstracted from widely known econometric models
of the copper industry. Equating the quantity supplied and demanded
simulates market behavior in a static context. This enables the model to
analyze the effects of alternative tax scenarios.
The Coal Model
The supply relationship for coal resembles that for copper because the
resource base and quality determine the cost of extraction. 7 Transpor-
tation costs are a major component of coal prices at the end use point,
while transportation charges for copper are relatively insignificant and
were ignored. This factor regionalizes coal markets. Furthermore, the
demand for coal originates primarily from electric power plants and to a
lesser degree from users of other boiler fuels and metallurgical processes
17. M. ZIMMERMAN, WESTERN COAL PRODUCING CARTEL (1980) (paper presented to
the Int'l. Assoc. of Energy Economists, Denver); M. ZIMMERMAN, THE COAL INDUSTRY:
THE ECONOMICS OF POLICY CHOICE (1980).
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which involve coking. The demand for steam coal derives from its use
for electricity. In this use, coal competes with other energy sources (re-
sidual oil, natural gas, uranium, hydro, and other renewable sources).
Furthermore, extraction costs for coal vary more widely than extraction
costs for copper. The differences between surface and underground tech-
nologies, safety and health regulations, coal quality and seam thickness
cause labor productivity and incremental extraction costs to vary widely.
Therefore, the coal model is regionalized and is made dynamic (1980 to
2000 are simulated) to account for interfuel substitution, lags in power
plant construction, and depletion as low cost reserves are exhausted. The
cost of extracting coal is modeled as a function of the scale of output
and the geological quality of the reserves (seam thickness for underground
mining and overburden ratio for strip mining). The optimal mine size
obtains at the point of minimization of unit cost.
The strategy in applying the coal model is to use the cost of extraction
and capital cost submodels to derive the minemouth price, quality (sulfur
content), and capacity (reserves) for each region. Transportation costs
are added to estimate the delivered price of coal, and supply functions
for six producing regions by sulfur content are derived. The demand for
coal is estimated from the electric power export, metallurgical, and in-
dustrial submodels. The estimated demand also accounts for a derived
demand from a linked electrical utility model of prices, power generation
technology (we assume nuclear power to be limited to previously an-
nounced plants until 1988 and that no new plants will come on line before
1993), and powerplant investment submodels aggregated into twelve con-
suming regions. Air quality regulations are complex and all power plants
constructed after 1979 must have stack scrubbers regardless of the sulfure
dioxide emissions achievable with low sulfur coal. These regulations are
modeled by assuming that no new plant can deteriorate air quality in any
region and that incremental coal conforms to New Source Performance
Standards limiting sulfur dioxide emissions to 1.2 pounds per million
British Thermal Units.
A linear programming structure allows simulation of coal market equi-
librium. The objective of the linear program is to deliver coal by desired
sulfur content to each consuming region at minimum aggregate cost. The
dual variable of the solution to this problem can be interpreted as the
imputed price of coal in each region. These prices are substituted back
into the electricity model to derive new estimated coal demands. The
iteration procedure continues until the computations yield no significant
difference in price and cost for delivered coal. In practice, the model is
solved in a simpler recursive manner with no loss in accuracy. Taxes are
included as cost of coal in each of the 16 producing states and are
embedded in the model when these states are aggregated into the six
July 19821
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producing regions. Coal tax policy is simulated by hypothesizing changes
in taxes on the output of coal in each state.
SIMULATING TAX REGIMES
The alternative tax scenarios in the copper and coal industries are
formulated to depict a few plausible situations selected from a large
spectrum of possible futures. The current (1977) tax situation as compared
to a zero-tax condition, is evaluated for both industries. This comparison
provides insight into the existing burden of taxes and establishes a bench-
mark condition. Utilizing the existing tax regime as a base case is preferred
to a zero-tax situation, however, because the existing tax regime creates
the initial condition from which all changes would be made.
Different future tax scenarios were posited for the two industries. For
copper, a uniform tax increase in all states and a unilateral increase by
Arizona, the largest producer, are hypothesized. For coal, the hypothe-
sized changes are that the low-cost, low-sulfur coal producing states of
Wyoming and Montana act in concert to maximize the present value of
the sum of future tax revenues plus the wage bill. This scenario is not
appropriate for copper because no single state or region enjoys quality
or cost advantages comparable to Arizona's (imports are a significant
constraining factor) and the more simplified structure of the model, par-
ticularly the market demand segment, diminishes confidence in the fore-
casts as large changes are made for any variable.
The scenarios are evaluated with regard to how production and con-
sumption are altered from a base case, the 1977 tax level. A changed tax
regime causes a short run change in price and output. Levels of production
change by greater magnitudes in the long run because investment may
take place at existing sites to increase or diminish capacity, or because
new sites can open in jurisdictions which levy lower taxes. The coal
model is dynamic, so that depletion (increasing costs of extraction) and
substitution among newly constructed coal and nuclear electric-power
plants occur. These changes, engendered by a permutation of tax regimes,
are evaluated for their effects on economic efficiency, on variables which
indicate who bears the burden of the tax as well as the industry wage
bill, and on tax revenues. Tax revenues indicate which tax policy goal,
economic development or tax maximization, is being achieved. Economic
efficiency losses are measured by foregone consumer surplus.' 8 The bur-
den of tax changes is measured for consumers by an increase in price of
the resource (or electricity), for labor by a change in the wage bill or
number of jobs (wage rates are assumed constant in both models), for
owners of resources and extractive firms by a change in economic rent
18. Note: positive numbers in Tables 2, 7, and 8 denote an efficiency loss.
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(only measured for copper), and for state residents by tax revenues from
the extractive industries. Tax exporting can be measured only from the
standpoint of consumers because data on the residence of owners of
resources and extractive firms is unavailable. In all cases, the bulk of
production is exported which implies that tax induced resource price
increases are borne by nonresidents and are thereby exported.
The estimated price, tax revenue, economic rent and output for the
domestic copper industry for the short and long run under a zero tax
regime and for current (1977) state taxes are shown in table 1. 11 The short
run equilibrium price represents only variable costs, while the long run
equilibrium price accounts for all costs and is closer to the actual market
price of copper. Four tax scenarios are evaluated in both the short and
long run: current state taxes versus zero taxes; a tax increase of 20 percent
of marginal costs pursued jointly by all producing states versus zero taxes;
a unilateral tax increase by Arizona, the largest producer, of 30 percent
of marginal cost versus zero taxes elsewhere; and a similar move by
Arizona versus current state taxes. Each scenario is evaluated by the
methods described earlier. In order to evaluate each scenario, six pieces
of information for each change in tax regimes are presented in table 2:
the change in market price, tax rate with respect to the value of output,
change in tax revenue, change in employment, change in economic rent,
and the Harberger measure of efficiency loss (net loss of consumer surplus
taking other taxes into account).
The imposition of 1977 state taxes results in virtually no dislocation
of employment or production. This, in turn, means that there are no
efficiency losses in the short run and less than a $100,000 welfare loss
in the long run resulting from a small reduction in output from Arizona.
Arizona is the major producing state, and, therefore, copper mining is a
seductively attractive tax target, as evidenced by the heaviest effective
tax rate among all the producing states.
The current tax rates (1977) produce modest increases in short and
long run prices ($0.02 per pound) which are borne by consumers and are
therefore exported. In the short run, industry benefits through higher rents
in all three states. In the long run, however, industry rents fall significantly
in Arizona and Montana, but the total decrease in rents is less than one-
fourth of the tax revenues raised, indicating that most of the tax is passed
forward to consumers. Current (1977) taxes seem to achieve both of the
pragmatic tax goals, tax revenues and industry growth, simultaneously.
State tax revenues are substantial in both the long and short runs (except
for New Mexico's, which are minimal in the long run). Industry's strong
opposition to Arizona's property taxes, which are invariant with respect
19. These data are taken from CHURCH, supra note 5.
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TABLE 1
Copper-Scenario Base Case
Price Pounds
per Tax Tax of
Pound Rate Revenue Total Rent Output($) (%) ($000) Employment ($000) (000)
Short Run
Zero taxes
Arizona
New Mexico
Utah
Current taxes
Arizona
New Mexico
Utah
Long Run
Zero taxes
Arizona
New Mexico
Utah
Montana
Nevada
Current taxes
Arizona
New Mexico
Utah
Montana
Nevada
0.45
0.47
2.59 23,464
1.40 1,690
0.81 2,197
10,355
1,283
3,300
10,355
1,283
3,300
1.10 0 0
8,256
105
1.07 8,428 3,977
1.80 5,304 1,394
47
1.12
1.9
0.80
1.07 8.428
1.80 5.034
0.01
33,270
419
3,977
1,394
2
8,232
105
12,700
39,838
47
$187,929
5,894
48,666
172,183
7,050
54,034
175,404
2,363
12,700
39,838
9,927
130,784
1,977
700,756
250,000
10,159
1,933,124
257,238
508,576
1,933,124
257,238
580,756
1,568,402
46,898
700,756
250,000
14,000
1,559,767
46,898
14,000
to output in the short run, is understandable because of significant loss
in long run rents to the industry. Note that tax revenues are nearly three
times larger than these rental losses in Arizona and nearly four times
those for all producing states taken together. Nevertheless, from an ef-
ficiency standpoint (judged by the economists's sacrosant Pareto Opti-
mality standard), the current tax regime is virtually without cost to society
as a whole. This cannot be said of the remaining scenarios, however,
because they involve large losses in both the long run and short run,
reaching $136 million for a 30 percent tax increase over current levels
imposed by Arizona.
In the second scenario, we assume that all producing states impose a
tax increase equaling 20 percent of marginal cost. The resulting annual
tax revenues can be described only as magnificent (totalling $52 million
in the short run and $375 million in the long run). This outcome results
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primarily from the relatively inelastic character specified for the copper
demand curve. Arizona experiences a significant employment loss in the
short run and Utah suffers a far greater one in the long run. The rise in
price ($0. 11 in the short run, or 22 percent, five times the increase due
to 1977 taxes; $0.26 in the long run, or 24 percent, is seven times the
increase due to 1977 taxes) means that consumers bear most of the tax
burden. In fact, industry economic rents increase dramatically in the short
run and comfortably in the long run in all states except New Mexico,
which experiences a loss. In the short run, efficiency losses are relatively
modest ($5.4 million), but are significant over the long haul ($49.2 million
in total). Nevertheless, increases in tax revenues swamp efficiency losses
and foregone income to unemployed miners.
Should Arizona decide to impose a tax equalling 30 percent of marginal
costs, industry will shut down much of its capacity in the short run and
leave the state in the long run. The 3,617 workers unemployed in the
short run may secure reemployment in New Mexico, Michigan, and
Nevada in the short or New Mexico and Michigan in the long run;
however, one third will have to leave the industry in the long run. At the
political "cost" of this large loss of employment, Arizona maintains short
run tax revenues above those found in the preceding scenario, but takes
nearly a two-thirds cut in the long run take (although the $67 million
increase over the existing tax structure might look attractive to some
legislators despite an employment loss for 6,364 workers). Tax revenues
in other states increase substantially as production shifts out of Arizona.
This scenario burdens consumers with price increases equal to those in
the previous scenarios, and they continue to bear the brunt of the tax
burden along with Arizona labor and its copper industry (a $42 million
short run loss in economic rents and $90.9 million long run loss compared
to 1977 taxes). Gains in economic rent in other states more than com-
pensate for Arizona's losses, so net industry rents increase. As would be
expected, both short and long run welfare losses are substantial-three
to six times higher than a move to a 20 percent joint tax increase. Arizona
probably would not pursue such a dramatic course. Although in the short
run, interestingly enough, increased tax revenues are nearly twice industry
rent losses, tax revenues are less than the loss in rents in the long run.
Further, the loss of 6,364 jobs represents an enormous loss in private
incomes. The decrease in sales and personal income tax revenue indirectly
derived from this income would approximate the gain in tax revenues
resulting from the increased severance tax.
This outcome illustrates that although Arizona may appear to possess
market power because of its dominant role in U.S. production, alternative
sources of supply would replace their output. Also, the burden on all
copper consumers resulting from the pursuit of such a dramatic course
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TABLE 2
Copper-Scenario Tax Effects
ASR,
Price Tax Rate Change
per on Value Tax Change in
Pound of Output Revenue in Rent
($) (%) ($000) Employment ($000)
Short Run
1977 Taxes
versus zero tax + 0.02
Arizona
New Mexico
Utah
2.59 24,464
1.40 1,609
0.81 2,179
28,333
11.03 106,440
14.05 20,234
9.42 30,642
-1,041 +41,051 +5,416
0 +588 0
0 + 10,169 0
+0.10
16.66 109,638 -3,617 -57,699 + 33,692
1.17 2,302 +656 +30,988 -318
0.69 2,198 0 +55,742 -0.3
2.74 3,178 +1,139 +831 -1,582
0.17 170 +2,102 +3,698 -6.5
117,486 190 +34,560 +32,055
Joint tax
increase to
20% of unit
cost versus
zero tax
Arizona
New Mexico
Utah
Arizona
unilateral tax
increase to
30% of cost
versus zero
taxes
Arizona
New Mexico
Utah
Montana
Michigan
Arizona
unilateral tax
increase to
30% of costs
versus current
taxes
Arizona
New Mexico
Utah
Montana
Michigan
16.66
1.17 86,174
0.69 612
2.74 1
0.17 3,178
170
90,135
-3,617 -42,053 +33,962
+656 +29,832 -1,145
0 +50,374 0
+1,139 +1,839 -1,582
+2,012 +3,698 -86
+43,690 +31,149
190
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Efficiency
Loss
($000)
0 +7,718
0 +2,846
0 +7,565
+ 18,129
+0.11
+ 0.08
ASR,
Price Tax Rate Change
per on Value Tax Change in
Pound of Output Revenue in Rent
($) (%) ($000) Employment ($000)
33,270
419
8,428
5,034
2,050
49,201
Efficiency
Loss
($000)
-23 -11,350
0 +33
0 +311
0 -1,692
-23 +234
0 -12,374
+91.9
0
0
0
0
+ 92.0
Joint tax in-
crease to 20%
of unit cost
versus zero tax + 0.26
Arizona
New Mexico
Utah
Montana
Nevada
13.49 285,738
8.96 5,711
14.55 41,737
12.03 40,849
6.07 1,154
375,189
-24 -8,909 -792.1
0 -1,459 0
-3,084 +478 +48,442
0 +6,047 0
0 +2,169 0
-3,108 +16,144 -49,234
17.79 100,416
1.12 5,825
0.88 8,430
1.48 5,038
1.60 4,036
0.0 2
123,747
-6,688 -135,620 + 139,586
+2,070 +58,851 -2,545
0 + 168,397 0
0 +58,179 0
+2,012 + 19,255 -2,012
0 +3,595 0
-2,606 + 155,357 + 135,029
Arizona unilat-
eral tax in-
crease to 30%
of costs versus
current taxes + 0.24
Arizona
New Mexico
Utah
Montana
Michigan
Nevada
17.79 67,146
1.12 5,406
0.88 2
1.48 4
1.60 4,036
0.0 0
76,594
-6,364 -90,990 + 138,541
+2,070 -59,237 -2,545
0 + 176,508 0
0 +64,905 0
+2,012 + 19,255 -209
0 +3,363 0
-2,282 +214,978 + 135,787
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TABLE 2 continued
+0.02
Long Run
1977 taxes ver-
sus zero tax
Arizona
New Mexico
Utah
Montana
Michigan
Arizona unilat-
eral tax in-
crease to 30%
of cost versus
zero taxes
Arizona
New Mexico
Utah
Montana
Michigan
Nevada
+0.26
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would be no greater than that resulting in the joint 20 percent tax scenario.
The copper demand estimate, however, is derived from others' research,
and its inelastic specification is most likely not borne out in long run
copper markets where foreign producers are playing an increasingly im-
portant role. 20 The static simulations indicate that existing taxes are for-
ward shifted to copper consumers in the short run, although a significant
portion of the taxes is borne by producers' economic rents. This implies
that welfare losses are small in the short run, but are substantial in the
long run for all tax scenarios. Tax increases made jointly by producing
states are primarily forward shifted. A unilateral tax increase undertaken
in Arizona results in large employment losses in the long run as production
is shifted to other states, but the tax appears to shift roughly two-thirds
of potential economic rents from producers to the state. Economic rents,
tax revenues and employment all increase in other producing states. Both
short and long run efficiency losses are substantial.
Additional simulations were carried out with all copper-producing states
simultaneously increasing tax rates, as a percentage of production cost,
from zero through 50 percent and with Arizona incrementally raising its
taxes unilaterally. 2' The results depend significantly on the demand func-
tion and were modeled over the long run. A simultaneous increase pro-
duces maximum tax revenues at a tax rate between 30 and 40 percent of
marginal costs. Arizona's share of U.S. production increases to a max-
imum of 78 percent. A unilateral tax increase by Arizona is far less
effective because of alternative sources of supply. Arizona's tax revenues
are essentially flat at incremental increases from 10 through 30 percent
and fall thereafter. Other states would benefit as their industries expanded.
As might be expected, Arizona's production and employment fall pre-
cipitously after a 10 percent tax increase is unilaterally invoked. These
data reveal the ability of simultaneous tax increases to increase the states'
share of resource revenues and the devastating effect a large scale uni-
lateral tax increase would have on the Arizona industry.
THE COAL TAX SCENARIOS
The coal tax scenarios are evaluated similarly to the copper tax scen-
arios. The coal model itself and the associated alternative tax scenarios
are, however, considerably different from those for copper. The demand
for coal is derived from a computer simulation model of the demand for
electricity and industrial coal, and both demand and supply functions are
dynamic (from 1977 through 2000).22 Electricity demand is sensitive to
20. CHURCH, supra note 5; Foley & Clark, supra note 16; Fisher, Cootner, & Martin, An
Econometric Model of the World Copper Industry, 3 BELL J. ECON. 568 (1972).
21. Foley & Clark, supra note 16.
22. CHURCH, supra note 5; ZIMMERMAN, THE COAL INDUSTRY, supra note 17.
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population, income, and the price of generating power by alternative
energy resources (hydroelectric, natural gas, oil, nuclear fission, and
coal). Interfuel competition means that the derived demand curve for coal
becomes ever more price-elastic as the time horizon becomes long enough
for substitution of one technology for another to take place. Recall that
the de facto moratorium on nuclear plants assumed in the model expires,
so that by 1993 the nuclear role may expand. The supply of coal is
determined by the extent and quality of coal reserves, the prices of inputs
into coal extraction and transportation and the tax regime in each state.
More importantly, the supply curve in the coal model reflects the economic
effect of rising extraction costs as deeper and thinner seam reserves are
extracted.
Computer simulations are made for four tax cases: 1) the base case
reflecting 1977 severance taxes; 2) a no-tax (state or federal) alternative
base case; and 3) and 4) a consortium of Montana and Wyoming maxi-
mizing the sum of tax revenues plus the wage bill to coal miners under
two slightly different assumptions. These scenarios are evaluated by com-
paring the base case against a no-tax regime, and the base case against
the Northern Plains consortium maximizing tax. The severance taxes for
the base case are shown in Table 3 and are expressed in ad valorem
(percentage-of-value) terms so that the severance tax burden is assumed
to increase with prices over time. The objective criterion used to derive
the optimum severance tax rate for a Montana/Wyoming cartel is maxi-
TABLE 3
Severance-Tax Rates Used in Base-Case Scenario
State Tax Rate (%)
Ohio 0.2
Pennsylvania 0.0
West Virginia 3.9
Alabama 1.3
Kentucky 4.3
Tennessee 0.8
Virginia 1.0
Illinois 5.0
Indiana 0.0
Montana 25.0
Wyoming 16.8
Colorado 3.0
Utah 0.0
Arizona 2.5
New Mexico 3.8
July 19821
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
mizing the present value of tax revenues or equivalently as it turns out,
a weighted sum of tax revenues plus the wage bill for the coal industry.
We assume that other producing states fail to act strategically by either
joining the cartel or unilaterally increasing their tax rates (constant at the
rates reported in Table 3). The linear-programming simulation of coal
markets is solved iteratively for increasing tax rates.
In order to carry out the derivation of the optimum tax, the base case
tax for each of the states in the Northern Plains consortium was assumed
to equal Wyoming's severance tax rate (16.8 percent) in 1977. If the large
differential severance tax rates were acknowledged, then all development
would occur in Wyoming (as it has from 1975 to 1981) until exhaustion
or until the consortium imposed tax equality. Therefore, the initial tax
rate is assumed to be 16.8 percent for both states. The results of this
exercise are shown in Table 4 for discount rates of 4.5 and 11.5 percent
under one set of assumptions. The optimum severance tax for the Mon-
tana/Wyoming cartel clearly appears to be 62.5 percent unless a policy
weight near to unity were placed on the wage bill and a near zero weight
placed on the tax revenue goal. This occurs because of the low labor
intensity of Western strip mining. This result was achieved after modi-
fications were made to an earlier set of assumptions. Utilizing the earlier
version produced an optimum tax rate of 75 percent. The implications of
TABLE 4
Present Value of Tax Revenues and Wage Bill for Montana/Wyoming under
Alternative Tax Levels
(billions of 1978 dollars)
Base-Case Nuclear Assumptions'
Real Discount Rates
Tax Level 4.5 Percent 11.5 Percent(%)
Tax Revenue Wage Bill Tax Revenue Wage Bill
18 8,265 5,814 3,848 2,867
35 11,045 5,086 5,379 2,496
50 14,425 4,663 7,012 2,291
62.5 16,380 4,246 7,717 2,028
75 14,733 3,198 6,834 1,513
100 11,593 1,914 5,496 939
150 11,219 1,260 5,827 685
200 11,317 971 6,208 563
Note: The 1979-1983 period reflects the de facto current moratorium.
'The maximum nuclear commitments in the base case (in gigawatts) were: pre-1979, announced as
of 1978: 1979-1983, 0; 1984, 4.8; 1985, 5.4; 1990, 10.1; 1995, 15.6; 2000, 30.2
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the 62.5 percent rate are reviewed first, and then the 75 percent rate is
employed to measure efficiency effects and tax burdens at the state level.
The two simulations, however, are substantially similar.
The effects of the tax conform to expectations. In the long run, the tax
reduces mine openings and expansions in Montana and Wyoming, shifts
this output to other states, and accelerates the substitution of nuclear
power for coal power after 1993. The effect on coal output disaggregated
into the six producing regions is shown in Table 5. The optimum tax
reduces output by the coal cartel from 657 million to 463 million tons
annually, and total U.S. steam coal production falls by 107 million tons
by the year 2000. The difference is supplied by the most efficient com-
petitors-the Midwest, the Colorado/Utah region, and Arizona/New Mex-
ico. Table 6 details the effect of the tax on electrical-power-plant type
for the nation and for consuming region 8, which is made up of the Rocky
Mountain states. The Rocky Mountain region is more dependent on Pow-
der River Basin low-sulfur coal than other regions and consequently bears
most of the effects resulting from more expensive coal and electricity.
These effects are balanced (if we ignore the undesirable effects of coal
extraction) by increased coal output in the region. In the long run effect,
a substitution of nuclear power generation for coal with scrubbers by the
year 2000 occurs. This substitution is accompanied by a modest (1 per-
cent) increase in electricity prices (the effect on electricity prices is shown
TABLE 5
Regional Coal Production under Base Case and 62.5 Percent Tax
(millions ton/year)
Region'
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
1980 Base 144.7 144.7 122.8 190.0 4.5 60.4 667
62.5% 130.4 160.0 141.9 62.9 64.3 81.7 641
1985 Base 145.1 140.2 76.3 324.9 15.7 80.0 782.2
62.5% 151.9 140.2 71.1 265.6 50.8 78.9 758.5
1990 Base 247.3 50.3 141.7 501.9 53.1 85.5 1,079.7
62.5% 262.4 38.0 143.9 406.5 83.3 108.2 1,042.2
1995 Base 245.1 51.6 146.9 562.8 85.8 81.5 1,174.6
62.5% 258.3 49.3 158.0 515.0 58.7 107.5 1,147.1
2000 Base 86.5 25.0 337.2 657.1 37.8 92.5 1,236.2
62.5% 170.5 31.5 312.1 463.4 83 68.5 1,129.0
Note: This excludes metallurgical and export coal. It also assumes that substantial nuclear-power
commitments can be made after 1983 for plants to come onstream after 1993.
'The regions are: I. northern Appalachia; 2. southern Appalachia; 3. Midwest; 4. Montana/Wyoming;
5. Colorado/Utah; 6. Arizona/New Mexico.
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TABLE 6
Generation Capacity by Plant Type in the Base Case Compared to the
62.5 Percent Tax Case
(gigawatts)
Base Case, Nuclear
Coal with Coal without
Year Scrubbers Scrubbers Nuclear
1990
Region 8
Base 49.8 22.9 2.0
62.5% 46.9 22.9 2.0
National
Base 268.9 172.0 124.9
62.5% 260.3 162.0 124.9
1995
Region 8
Base 59.0 20.8 1.9
62.5% 55.1 20.8 1.9
National
Base 347.8 153.9 217.7
62.5% 339.2 154.0 218.4
2000
Region 8
Base 84.3 18.4 1.7
62.5% 64.1 18.4 17.7
National
Base 403.0 133.8 351.4
62.5% 378.9 133.9 369.3
in table 7). This result depends critically on an assumed cost of nuclear
power plants which may be unrealistically low, particularly in view of
Three Mile Island and continuing uncertainty regarding the future of the
industry.
Western coal is a transport-intensive industry because of the great
distances to major demand centers. Transport cost accounts for a large
proportion of the delivered cost of Powder River Basin coal. If we tem-
porarily assume that the rents go exclusively to a single monopoly carrying
coal from the Powder River Basin, we may estimate the increase in
railroad tariffs comparable to the optimal severance tax. The 62.5 percent
tax is equivalent to a charge of roughly $4 per ton in 1980 (net of state
and federal taxes and fees). Assumed Montana tax levels of 16.8 percent
account for approximately $1 of that figure. Thus, the difference between
[Vol. 22
ECONOMIC RENT
TABLE 7
Electricity Prices
(mills per Kilowatthour)
1980 1990 2000
Base 62.5 Base 62.5 Base 62.5
Region Case Percent Case Percent Case Percent
New England 55.7 55.7 101.6 101.7 157.2 156.7
Middle Atlantic 44.3 44.3 93.1 93.3 157.1 157.1
East North Central 39.8 40.2 69.2 70.4 126.0 126.0
West North Central 39.5 40.9 72.6 73.1 124.6 124.5
South Atlantic 39.6 39.6 78.3 78.4 136.3 137.1
East South Central 31.9 32.0 61.2 61.1 98.9 99.0
West South Central 50.3 50.3 69.3 70.2 124.1 127.3
Rocky Mountain 31.8 32.5 68.4 69.8 104.6 107.3
Pacific 34.4 34.4 72.4 72.0 126.9 127.374.7
National Average 39.9 40.2 74.2 126.4 127.5
today's level and the "optimum" amounts to about $3 per ton. That figure
represents 16 to 24 percent of the transport cost to Chicago, and it is
roughly equal to rate increases secured in the late 1970s from the Interstate
Commerce Commission on unit coal trains to the Midwest and Texas.
23
As of 1980, the Burlington Northern Railroad has a monopoly on trans-
porting coal from this region. The expectation of profitable coal hauling
induced their management to invest $1 billion from 1975 to 1980 and
another $1 billion projected by 1985 to upgrade lightweight trackage to
withstand the grueling task of supporting 100-ton hopper cars speeding
along in 100-car trains. These investments have enabled Burlington North-
ern Railroad to argue successfully for rate increases from the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC). The Railroad Deregulation Act, however,
may enable the small Chicago and North Western Transportation Co. to
qualify for federal loan guarantees ($310 million) and hook up to the
powerful Union Pacific Railroad. 24 This competition would reduce Bur-
lington Northern's bargaining power to extract economic rents. The pro-
posed coal slurry pipeline poses another source of potential competition.
The pipeline's promoters are seeking the right of eminent domain so that
they can compel railroads to share rights-of-way.
The outcomes from the coal-tax scenarios involving the 75 percent
optimum tax rates calculated from slightly more restrictive assumptions
regarding nuclear power are evaluated for the tax burden and efficiency
23. ZIMMERMAN, WESTERN COAL PRODUCING CARTEL, supra note 17.
24. Deregulating the Rates, BUS. WK. (September 22, 1980).
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loss in Tables 8 and 9. The base case versus no-tax scenario and the 75
percent optimum tax versus the base case are analyzed for tax-induced
tax effects at coal consumption and production stages. The percentage
change in the wage bill and in tax revenue, and the welfare loss for
purchases at the minemouth are calculated for each coal producing state
in 1980, 1990 and 2000 (Table 7). When taxes are already in place and
are increased in one region, as in our comparison of the maximum tax
to the base case, the net welfare cost is calculated as the incremental
distortion in the states increasing their taxes (one-half the induced change
in output times the change in the tax rate). In states maintaining their tax
rates, increase in production owing to demand shifting from another
region with higher taxes will reduce the efficiency loss caused by their
own tax. The tax increase shifts demand curves for competing coal states,
which results in increased output and a reduction in the efficiency loss
induced by their own previously levied taxes (that is, output is closer to
what it would have been in a no-tax situation). Table 9 shows the tax-
induced percentage change in the price of coal and electricity in each
consuming region and the net welfare loss to coal consumers by region.
The complexities inherent in the electricity demand and supply model,
the wide array of pre-existing taxes and regulations on the electric utilities,
combined with data and model limitations preclude computing the true
net welfare costs based on the estimated change in electricity prices.
What can be said about the data from the scenarios? For consuming
regions (Table 9) the welfare costs of the base case versus a no-tax
situation are relatively small ($4.25 million in 1981 and $42.9 million
in 2000, and note that a minus signifies an improvement in welfare). The
imposition of a 75 percent severance tax in Montana and Wyoming,
however, generates significantly larger, but still modest, welfare losses.
Consequently, more costly coal is extracted in other regions (an incre-
mental loss above the base case of $0.9 million in 1981 and $149.1
million in 2000). The East North Central (Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin,
Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky), West North Central (Minnesota, Ne-
braska, Kansas, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Missouri), and
Rocky Mountain regions (New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, Idaho,
Wyoming, and Montana) experience the brunt of these efficiency losses
in consumer surplus implied from their simulated demand for coal. These
losses are small because the relatively inelastic demand (in the short run)
for electricity generated from coal means that although coal prices in-
crease, demand falls only modestly and thus the loss of consumer surplus
is relatively small. Coal price increases indicate that most of the tax is
passed forward to consumers in these three regions. However, welfare
losses measured for the producing states are substantial ($218.1 million
in 1980 and peaking at $1458.8 million in 1990) in the case involving
[Vol. 22
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the 75 percent tax increase above the base case (Table 7) because of
changing location and cost of coal extraction. The welfare costs of the
1977 tax regime are considerably less, but still substantial compared to
the zero tax condition. (The -$8.3 million figure in 1980 signifies the
gain resulting from the recision of all taxes. By 2000, the welfare gain
increases to $476.6 million.) These losses exceed those measured in coal
consuming regions because of the differences in regional elasticities of
demand for coal at the point of production and consumption, and because
the delivered price of coal includes shipping costs. These two sets of
estimates may be interpreted as an estimated upper and lower bounds to
welfare losses.
The linked electricity-demand, coal-supply model provides an estimate
of the effect on the price of electricity (busbar price or price at the base-
load power plant). Table 9 shows the increased price due to the 75 percent
tax versus the base case. Because of the regulatory regime of utilities
and the assumption in the model that all costs are passed on to consumers,
this estimate provides insight into both the welfare losses associated with
the 75 percent tax and the burden placed on consumers. The price increase
borne by consumers in the Midwest (East North Central and West North
Central) and Rocky Mountain regions are relatively modest. Furthermore,
by 2000, price increases have been mitigated by conversion to nuclear
power and conservation. Although this option may be technologically
viable, the future of nuclear power appears highly uncertain because of
political and social constraints, as evidenced by the occurrence and re-
sponse to Three Mile Island. Given the assumptions built into this model,
the modest effects on electricity prices imply that welfare losses to con-
sumers are commensurately modest. However, the relatively large welfare
losses measured for coal producing states and the uncertainty regarding
the economic and political viability of expanded nuclear capacity mean
that these estimates of real price increases for electricity must be consid-
ered a lower bound on the costs which consumers may bear. This portion
of the tax burden is exported almost in toto by the Montana/Wyoming
consortium to the Midwest and Rocky Mountain states.
The estimated changes in the wage bill for the coal industry and in tax
revenues indicate how the tax burden is incurred within each producing
state. The data in Table 8 clearly illustrate that Wyoming and Montana
taxpayers are beneficiaries. These additional revenues would be used
either to expand government supplied services or to reduce other taxes.
The 50 percent fall of mining employment in Wyoming indicates that
miners would have to move to other states. These states can be identified
by observing where tax revenues and wage bills increase because of
shifted production. New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, Arizona, and Illinois
are clear beneficiaries, although Arizona and New Mexico experience
more rapid depletion and a subsequent absolute fall in production, tax
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revenue, and employment by 2000. Presumably miners are able to shift
location from Montana and Wyoming to Colorado, Utah and Arizona
with relative ease and reasonable moving costs. The Wyoming/Montana
Powder River Basin boomtowns will decline in employment, economic
activity, and population. Tax revenues will make up these losses many
times over, although the distribution of income within the state will be
affected. The non-coal miner, non-boomtown resident will benefit whereas
those individuals more directly affected by coal extraction (property own-
ers, business managers, and so on in coal areas) may suffer net losses
compared to the base-case scenario. Shifting output means that states in
which more is produced are net beneficiaries insofar as tax revenues and
coal-industry wage bill increases are concerned. Without actively partic-
ipating in the consortium, these states become beneficiaries. The benefits
that might derive from active participation in the coal cartel presents an
empirical question. The tradeoff between tax revenue and industry em-
ployment for the Montana/Wyoming consortium was shown to be insen-
sitive to the relative weight placed on these conflicting goals. An implausibly
high wage bill weight is required before the optimum tax is changed,
which implies that coal industry representatives would be hard pressed
to alter this tax level.
Two recent controversies evidence the competition for the economic
rents implied by the 75 percent tax. The first involves coal unit train rate
increases and rate-making formulas approved by the Interstate Commerce
Commission which allow for profit margins in excess of those allowed
for other classes of service. The Burlington Northern Railroad enjoys
monopoly access to the Powder River Basin of Montana and Wyoming.
Burlington Northern has steadfastly fought efforts of other railroads to
utilize their tracks or build competing lines, has refused to give rights of
way to proposed coal slurry pipelines, and has fought legislation giving
these projects the right of eminent domain. The second controvery con-
cerns proposals introduced into Congress in 1980,25 but never acted on
to limit state coal severance taxes to a 12.5 percent maximum. Further-
more, in the recent case brought by coal consumers against Montana the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the right of Montana to invoke its 30 percent
severance tax.26 This holding has enlivened the battle over natural resource
state tax limitation.
CONCLUSION
The economist's toolbag provides two devices for evaluating a tax.
One measures the net economic loss to society as a whole and ignores
25. Limit on State Severance Taxes on Coal Recommended, 105 PUBLIC UTILITIES (1980);
Western Coal Sparks a Test of States' Rights, BUS. WK. (February 16, 1981).
26. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12.
July 19821
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
pure income redistribution. The other determines who bears the final tax
burden (shifting and incidence). The measure of tax distortion is the sum
of losses to consumers (the difference between willingness to pay and
market price) and to producers (profits in excess of the opportunity cost
of all resources used in the production process). Economic theory states
that these losses are measurable if a number of assumptions are met and
certain economic behavior can be forecast accurately.
Primary among these assumptions are the notions that all markets are
competitive, that information is perfect, and that all social costs of con-
sumption and production activities are borne by producers and consumers,
respectively. Extensive government resource ownership accompanied by
noncompetitive leasing, price and development regulatory controls, and
monopolistic elements at the transportation and electric power generation
stages of energy production are examples of noncompetitive elements not
developed in this paper. Virtually no empirical tests have been made of
the extent of these distortions.
This paper presented an approximate estimate of tax distortions falling
on consumers in alternative tax scenarios for the copper and coal industries
(only consumer surplus was measured) and concluded that the net eco-
nomic loss is relatively small. Resource taxes as implemented in the real
world, however, are diverse and complex. The special provisions in the
U.S. corporate income tax for depletion, expensing, and capital gains,
and the involved calculation of the property tax bases as the present value
of future profit, used in copper in Arizona, are but a few examples. The
actual net effects of tax policy are unknown, but the crude efficiency
losses as estimated here define plausible bounds. Furthermore, resource
extraction undoubtedly creates external and uncompensated losses be-
cause of environmental degradation (air, land and water pollution). These
"market failures" or distortions preclude confidence in approximations
of efficiency losses.
The second method of evaluation entails considering who bears the
ultimate tax burden. The tax scenarios simulated for the domestic copper
and coal industries indicate that most of the tax is passed forward to
consumers via higher, albeit relatively small, price increases. These bur-
dens are greater in the short run than over longer periods as investment
decisions are made in response to a new tax regime. In the long run, the
alternative tax policies engendered large scale shifts in the location of
resource extraction to jurisdictions with lower taxes. The models of the
two industries contain methodological biases which underestimate the
costs of these tax induced location shifts. The losses to owners of resources
and extractive firms may be substantial (short term greater than long term
losses) and the disruption caused by moving the specialized labor force
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and the fiscal impacts to single industry, extractive resource based mu-
nicipalities were not estimated in the scenarios.
Special interest groups lobbying for government tax and regulatory
policies in their own interests, and the financial needs of state and local
governments influence tax policy more significantly than theoretical goals
such as minimizing total social distortions and efficiency losses. Indeed,
these goals appear correlated to tax policy in the real world. Legislators
and other elected officials act to stay in power. This political reality
necessitates balancing the goal of raising and spending tax revenues against
ensuring a strong and growing private economy. The size and apparent
profitability of resource extraction coupled with the apparent tendency to
export almost all of the product from resource rich states makes resource
extraction an appealing tax target. Resource tax policies in the western
states since the mid-1970s reveal this incentive.
Elected officials and the press frequently argue severance taxes in terms
of tax exporting and compensation for social costs and resource base
depletion.27 The review of the relevant economic theory and its application
to the copper and coal industries presented here reveal that economic
rents are probably substantial and that various interest groups including
the state vie for them. Regrettably, this competition may result in the
dissipation of some or all of these rents by those groups attempting to
secure them.
27. Link, Political Constraint and North Dakota's Coal Severance Tax, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 263
(1978); L. LEISTRITZ & S. MURDOCK, THE SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT OF RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT (1981).
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